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Money creationHow do banks operate andwhere does themoney supply come from? The ﬁnancial crisis has heightened aware-
ness that these questions have been unduly neglected bymany researchers. During the past century, three differ-
ent theories of banking were dominant at different times: (1) The currently prevalent ﬁnancial intermediation
theory of banking says that banks collect deposits and then lend these out, just like other non-bank ﬁnancial in-
termediaries. (2) The older fractional reserve theory of banking says that each individual bank is a ﬁnancial inter-
mediarywithout the power to createmoney, but the banking system collectively is able to createmoney through
the process of ‘multiple deposit expansion’ (the ‘moneymultiplier’). (3) The credit creation theory of banking, pre-
dominant a century ago, does not consider banks as ﬁnancial intermediaries that gather deposits to lend out, but
instead argues that each individual bank creates credit andmoney newlywhen granting a bank loan. The theories
differ in their accounting treatment of bank lending as well as in their policy implications. Since according to the
dominant ﬁnancial intermediation theory banks are virtually identical with other non-bank ﬁnancial intermedi-
aries, they are not usually included in the economic models used in economics or by central bankers. Moreover,
the theory of banks as intermediaries provides the rationale for capital adequacy-based bank regulation. Should
this theory not be correct, currently prevailing economicsmodelling and policy-makingwould bewithout empir-
ical foundation. Despite the importance of this question, so far only one empirical test of the three theories has
been reported in learned journals. This paper presents a second empirical test, using an alternativemethodology,
which allows control for all other factors. Theﬁnancial intermediation and the fractional reserve theories of bank-
ing are rejected by the evidence. This ﬁnding throws doubt on the rationale for regulating bank capital adequacy
to avoid banking crises, as the case study of Credit Suisse during the crisis illustrates. The ﬁnding indicates that
advice to encourage developing countries to borrow from abroad is misguided. The question is considered why
the economics profession has failed over most of the past century to make any progress concerning knowledge of
the monetary system, and why it instead moved ever further away from the truth as already recognised by the
credit creation theory well over a century ago. The role of conﬂicts of interest and interested parties in shaping
the current bank-free academic consensus is discussed. A number of avenues for needed further research are
indicated.
© 2015 The Author. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
The failure by leading economists to incorporate banking in their
economic theories has been identiﬁed as a signiﬁcant and costly weak-
ness (Werner, 1997, 2005; Kohn, 2009). Likewise, it has been pointed
out that the macro-economic feedback of banking activity had beend Mr. Michael Betzenbichler,
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This is an open access article under tneglected in ﬁnance research (Werner, 2012). Recognition of these
shortcomings has led to the emergence of ‘macro ﬁnance’ as a new dis-
cipline, nested within the ﬁnance research agenda. The present paper
contributes to this growing literature by addressing a long-standing
central dispute about the role and function of banks, which has major
implications for monetary and macroeconomics, ﬁnance and banking,
as well as government policy: it is the question whether a bank lends
existing money or newly creates the money it lends.
As Werner (2014b) showed, during different time periods of the
20th century, one of three distinct and mutually exclusive theories of
banking has been dominant: The oldest, the credit creation theory of
banking, maintains that each bank can individually create money ‘out
of nothing’ through accounting operations, and does sowhen extending
a loan. The fractional reserve theory states that only the banking system
as awhole can collectively createmoney,while each individual bank is ahe CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
1 Von Mises also pointed out that
“…those banks that issue notes or open current accounts… have a fund fromwhich to
grant loans, over and above their own resources and those resources of other people
that are at their disposal”
(Mises, 1980, p. 304).
Mises (1912) thought that banks could act either as ﬁnancial intermediaries, in which case
they would not create money, or at times stop being ﬁnancial intermediaries and function as
creators of credit and money. How this should be reﬂected in terms of bank accounting re-
mains unclear and doubtful. This line of thinkingmay, on a high level, however have prepared
the ground for the idea that banks could be ﬁnancial intermediaries on the one hand and on
the other, somehow, create money— a position that the fractional reserve theorymaintains.
362 R.A. Werner / International Review of Financial Analysis 46 (2016) 361–379mere ﬁnancial intermediary, gathering deposits and lending these out.
The ﬁnancial intermediation theory considers banks asﬁnancial interme-
diaries both individually and collectively, rendering them indistinguish-
able from other non-bank ﬁnancial institutions in their behaviour,
especially concerning the deposit and lending businesses, being unable
to create money individually or collectively.
Although various economists support each of the three theories, and
despite the pivotal signiﬁcance for research and policy, the question
which of the three theories is accurate has until recently not been em-
pirically examined. The ﬁrst empirical test published in a learned jour-
nal on this issue was Werner (2014b), in which the author obtained
the cooperation of a bank to examine the actual operations and account-
ing entries taking placewhen a ‘live’ bank loan is granted and paid out. It
was found that only the credit creation theory was consistent with the
observed empirical evidence. However, as a ‘live’ empirical test of a
bank in operation, the test design did not allow a fully controlled envi-
ronment: Advances in IT and service offerings mean that bank opera-
tions take place continuously, even ‘after hours’ and during holidays
(thanks to online banking and round-the-clock banking IT systems).
As a result, during the observation interval of one day, other transac-
tions took place in addition to the test transaction. While the ﬁnal re-
sults of the test were unambiguous, a number of aggregated
uncontrolled factors had to be jointly evaluated. Therefore as a robust-
ness check it would be desirable to test the three theories of banking
using a different methodology, in a fully controlled environment, with-
out the potential interference from other transactions.
The main contribution of the present paper is to provide such an al-
ternative empirical test, allowing complete control of all other factors.
For this purpose, use is made of the fact that modern banking and its
constituent accounting operations take place entirely within the IT sys-
tems of banks. In this paper a controlled test design is proposed that
uses the relevant banking software to simulate a bank loan transaction
and booking it as if it was a real transaction.While humansmay change
their behaviour in such simulation situations when they become aware
of the nature of the test, such potential bias does not apply to software
code. The test of booking a bank loan in banking software yields the
ﬁnding that the credit creation theory of banking alone conforms to
the empirical facts, providing a separate and different corroboration of
the ﬁndings in Werner (2014b).
The results from the test on bank lending are used to throw new
light on capital adequacy-based bank regulation (such as the Basel
III/CRR approach) and its alleged ability to prevent banking crises,
illustrated through the case of the capital raising by Swiss bank Credit
Suisse in 2008. It is found that capital adequacy-based bank regulation
cannot prevent banking crises. Instead, it is noted that central bank
guidance of bank credit and banking systems dominated by small
banks have a superior track record in generating stable growth
without crises.
Furthermore, the question is asked why the economics profession
has singularly failed overmost of the past century tomake any progress
in terms of knowledge of themonetary system, and insteadmoved ever
further away from the truth as already recognised by the credit creation
theory well over a century ago. The role of conﬂicts of interest is
discussed and a number of avenues for needed further research are
indicated.
The paper is structured as follows: The second section will brieﬂy
survey the literature on the three theories of banking and their differing
accounting implications. Section 3 presents the new empirical test.
Section 4 analyses and interprets the results. Section 5 applies the in-
sights to examining capital adequacy-based bank regulation, consider-
ing the case of Credit Suisse. Section 6 discusses the implications for
development policies, and speciﬁcally, the advice for developing coun-
tries to borrow from abroad in order to stimulate economic growth.
Section 7 considers the failure by academic and central bank economists
to make progress for a century concerning the role of banks. Closing
words are recorded in Section 8.2. A brief overview of the three main theories of banking and their
accounting
Like Werner (2014b), this brief literature review is conﬁned to
works by authors who are concerned with banks that cannot issue
bank notes. With a few exceptions, the citations differ from those in
Werner (2014b) and are meant to complement them. Several authors
of the ‘Austrian’ and ‘post-Keynesian’ schools of thought are included,
which had not been cited by Werner (2014b).
2.1. The ﬁnancial intermediation theory of banking
The presently dominant ﬁnancial intermediation theory holds
that banks are merely ﬁnancial intermediaries, not different from
other non-bank ﬁnancial institutions: they gather deposits and
lend these out (Fig. 1). In the words of recent authors, “Banks cre-
ate liquidity by borrowing short and lending long” (Dewatripont,
Rochet, & Tirole, 2010), meaning that banks borrow from deposi-
tors with short maturities and lend to borrowers at longer
maturities.
The ﬁnancial intermediation theory of banking is publicised by high-
ly ranked economics journals, and also includes some well-known
economists. Examples are Keynes (1936); Gurley and Shaw (1955);
Tobin (1963, 1969); Sealey and Lindley (1977); Diamond and Dybvig
(1983); Baltensperger (1980); Diamond (1984, 1991, 1997); Eatwell,
Milgate, and Newman (1989); Gorton and Pennacchi (1990);
Bencivenga and Smith (1991); Bernanke and Gertler (1995), Rajan
(1998), Myers and Rajan (1998), Allen and Gale (2004a, 2004b); Allen
and Santomero (2001); Diamond and Rajan (2001); Kashyap, Rajan,
and Stein (2002); Matthews and Thompson (2005); Casu and
Girardone (2006); Dewatripont et al. (2010); Gertler and Kiyotaki
(2011) and Stein (2014).
Earlier proponents of this theory include von Mises (1912), who
wrote:
“The activity of the banks as negotiators of credit is characterised by
the lending of other people's, that is, of borrowed,money. Banks bor-
row money in order to lend it; … Banking is negotiation between
granters of credit and grantees of credit. Only those who lend the
money of others are bankers; thosewhomerely lend their own cap-
ital are capitalists, but not bankers”
(Mises, 1980, p. 294f).
While Mises argued that this was only one of the functions of
banks,1 Keynes (1936) in his General Theory clearly states that for in-
vestments to take place, savings ﬁrst need to be gathered. This view
has also been reﬂected in the Keynesian growth models by Harrod
(1939) and Domar (1947), which are based on the ﬁnancial interme-
diation theory of banking, although not explicitly modelling banks. In-
deed, this theory provides the justiﬁcation for failing to incorporate
banks and the way they operate in economic models. Harrod and
Domar's conclusions have had a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on economic
policy in the post-war era, as their work has been interpreted to
the effect that developing countries could be helped by international
banks who could provide missing domestic savings through their
Fig. 1. The ﬁnancial intermediation theory of banking.
Source: Werner (2005).
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resulted in a signiﬁcant increase in foreign borrowing and indebted-
ness by developing countries since the second world war.
Gurley and Shaw (1955, 1960) argue that banks and non-bank ﬁnan-
cial institutions largely share the function of being ﬁnancial intermedi-
aries, thus arguing that there is nothing special about banks. Tobin
(1963) backed this view in his inﬂuential work. He argued:
“The distinction between commercial banks and other ﬁnancial
intermediaries has been too sharply drawn. The differences are
of degree, not of kind... In particular, the differences which do ex-
ist have little intrinsically to do with the monetary nature of bank
liabilities… The differences are more importantly related to the
special reserve requirements and interest rate ceilings to which
banks are subject. Any other ﬁnancial industry subject to the
same kind of regulations would behave in much the same way”
(p. 418).
Since in many countries, such as the UK, today there are neither in-
terest rate ceilings nor reserve requirements for banks, Tobin's classiﬁ-
cation of banks as ﬁnancial intermediaries should hold true more than
ever, since he staked any differences between banks and non-bank ﬁ-
nancial intermediaries on these.
Sealey and Lindley (1977) develop aproduction theory for depository
institutions:
“The transformation process for aﬁnancialﬁrm involves the borrow-
ing of funds from surplus spending units and lending those funds to
deﬁcit spending units, i.e. ﬁnancial intermediation” (p. 1252).
“…the production process of theﬁnancialﬁrm, from theﬁrm's view-
point, is amultistage production process involving intermediate out-
puts, where loanable funds, borrowed from depositors and serviced
by the ﬁrm with the use of capital, labor and material inputs, are
used in the production of earning assets” (p. 1254).
Baltensperger (1980) also believes banks are merely ﬁnancial inter-
mediaries, unable to createmoney, and instead engaging in a somewhat
vague process of ‘risk transformation’:
“The main economic functions of ﬁnancial ﬁrms are those of con-
solidating and transforming risks on the one hand, and of serving
as dealers or ‘brokers’ in the credit markets… on the other hand”
(p. 1).
Riordan (1993) holds that
“Banks serve as ﬁnancial intermediaries between borrowers and
lenders. More precisely, banks borrow from depositors and lendto investors…. In a capitalist economy most investment projects
are owned and managed by private entrepreneurs and ﬁrms.
Generally these investors lack enough equity fully to ﬁnance their
projects and consequently seek loans to complete ﬁnancing.
Banks, on the other hand, aggregate deposits tomake these loans”
(p. 328).
Kashyap et al. (2002) believe that banks are pure ﬁnancial interme-
diaries, presenting amodel of banking in which a bank purchases assets
with funds it had acquired in the form of deposits or the issuance of eq-
uity or bonds. The authors seem to be envisaging a cash-based economy,
whereby deposits constitute amounts of cash paid in:
“The total assets to be ﬁnanced at date 0 are L + S0. They are ﬁ-
nanced partly by demandable deposits…. In addition to de-
posits, the bank can also issue claims in the public market….
These claims mature at date 2, and can be thought of as either
bonds or equity” (p. 41).
The more recent and substantial ‘credit view’ literature (such as
Bernanke and Blinder, 1988; Bernanke and Gertler, 1995), the monitor-
ing literature on ﬁnancial intermediation (Diamond, 1984; Sheard,
1989), and the sizeable literature on the various other theories of ﬁnan-
cial intermediation, do not distinguish banks from other non-bank ﬁ-
nancial institutions (see, for instance, Casu et al., 2006). The authors in
these branches of the literature hold that banks are just another type
of ﬁnancial intermediary among many, without the power to create
credit in any way.
Inﬂuential textbooks on money and banking are also propo-
nents of the ﬁnancial intermediation theory, such as that by
Cecchetti (2008), who does not consider banks able to create credit
or money:
“…an institution like a bank stands between the lender and the bor-
rower, borrowing from the lender and then providing the funds to
the borrower” (p. 39)
…or the banking textbook by Casu et al. (2006):
“Banks, as other ﬁnancial intermediaries, play a pivotal role in the
economy, channelling funds from units in surplus to units in deﬁcit.
They reconcile the different needs of borrowers and lenders by
transforming small-size, low-risk and highly liquid deposits into
loans which are of larger size, higher risk and illiquid (transforma-
tion function)” (p. 18).
Matthew and Thompson (2005) state that banks ﬁrst need to obtain
deposits in order to be able to lend:
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ﬁnancial institutions rather than directly from the surplus units
themselves. Hence, ﬁnancial intermediation is a process which in-
volves surplus units depositing funds with ﬁnancial institutions
who in turn lend to deﬁcit units” (p. 33).
“An exogenous increase in the demand for loans shifts the LL sched-
ule up to LL’ and increases the loan rate. The bank (or banking sys-
tem in the case of a non-monopoly bank) will respond by
supplying more loans and deposits. To attract more deposits, the
bank (banking system)will bid for deposits by increasing the depos-
it rate” (p. 110).
As there is no clear distinction of banks from non-banks in such
models, economists also see no reason why banks need to be sin-
gled out for special treatment or indeed included in their macro-
economic theories at all. Thus it came to pass that the seminal
articles in leading journals and widely-used macroeconomics and
monetary economics textbooks have long dropped out banks en-
tirely: banks do not feature at all in ‘advanced macroeconomics’
or ‘advanced monetary economics’ textbooks, such as the inﬂuen-
tial 785-page tome by Woodford (2003), the 820 pages of Heijdra
and Van der Ploeg (2002) or the 751 pages of Sorensen and
Whitta-Jacobsen (2010).
Finally, even recent popular discussions of banking, written by
ﬁnance or economics professors with the hindsight of the ﬁnancial
crisis of 2008, continue to present banks as mere ﬁnancial
intermediaries:2 Smith (1959), for instance, argues in theQuarterly Journal of Economics that banks ‘can
create money’ and that “their credit-creating activities expand the supply of loanable
funds available to ﬁnance expenditure”.…
“Commercial banks do have a special ability to expand credit for a reason that is sim-
ple but often overlooked…. What is truly unique... about commercial banks is… their
distinctive role as issuers of means of payment [which] gives commercial banks a pe-
culiar ability to expand credit” (p. 535).
Smith argues that banks are (presumably in aggregate) not ﬁnancial intermediaries and
their function is distinct from that of ﬁnancial intermediaries (what in modern parlance
is referred to as ‘non-bank ﬁnancial intermediaries’). According to Smith, the money cre-
ation by banks is due to a ‘multiplier process’ (which he also calls the “credit expansion
multiplier” or “multiple credit creation”):
“Commercial bank credit creation makes funds available to ﬁnance expenditures in
excess of the funds arising out of the current income ﬂow. Intermediaries, to the ex-
tent that their activities are as described so far, merely collect a portion of current vol-
untary saving and serve the function of making these funds available for the ﬁnancing
of current expenditures— i.e., they help to channel saving into investment in a broad
sense. Thus, intermediaries are exactly what their name indicates. Commercial banks,
on the other hand, are distinctly not intermediaries” (p. 538).
3 Earlier authors include Marshall (1890).“…banks make their proﬁts by taking in deposits and lending the
funds out at a higher rate of interest”
(Krugman, 2015).
“The bank acts as an intermediary, channeling money from thou-
sands of depositors and other investors to its loan clients”
(Admati and Hellwig, 2012, p. 50).
“The use of deposits to fund loans has been a standard practice in
banking for centuries”
(op. cit., p. 51).
“…the use of deposits and short-termdebt to fund loans has gone on
for centuries and is enshrined in banking textbooks…”
(op. cit., p. 51).
“…banks beneﬁt the economy by taking deposits and making
loans. Of these two activities, deposit taking is unique to banks.
Loans can also be made by any other institution that has the ca-
pacity to assess the loan applicants' creditworthiness and to
monitor their performance. The concentration of banks on lend-
ing is due to ready availability of funds from deposits”
(op. cit., p. 148).
2.2. The fractional reserve theory of banking
This theory of banking also argues that each bank is a ﬁnancial in-
termediary. However, it disagreeswith the former theory concerning
the collective, macroeconomic role of banks: it argues that, together,
the banking system creates money, through the process of ‘multiple
deposit expansion’. Thus when Gurley and Shaw (1955) argued that
banks and non-bank ﬁnancial institutions are largely similar in that
they were both ﬁnancial intermediaries able to ‘create ﬁnancial
claims’, they were challenged during the 1950s and 1960s in inﬂuen-
tial journals by, among others, Culbertson (1958), Aschheim (1959),
Warren Smith (1959), Solomon (1959), Paul Smith (1966) and
Guttentag and Lindsay (1968), many of whom were supporters ofthe fractional reserve theory.2 Phillips' citation of the credit or
money multiplier rendered him one of the earlier and most inﬂuen-
tial economists to formulate the mechanics of fractional reserve
banking.3 According to Phillips:
“What is true for the banking system as an aggregate is not true for
an individual bank that constitutes only one ofmany units in that ag-
gregate.”
(Phillips, 1920, p. 40).
Crick (1927) is another supporter of this theory. He argues that
while each bank is a ﬁnancial intermediary, the system as a whole can
create money. Like later Keynes and Tobin, Crick adopted the habit of
placing the concept of creation in inverted commas (‘credit “creation”’).
This implies scepticism, if not even derision and ridicule for those who
believe in the ability of banks to create credit. While not entirely deny-
ing the potential for banks to create credit andmoney, Crick (1927) and
colleagues succeeded in downplaying the signiﬁcance of any such ac-
tion and re-assuring the public – or academia – that all was under con-
trol, as the money creation was the result of a kind of diffuse process, a
technical detail that experts might debate, but which was of little direct
consequence for the economic model builder.
Friedrich von Hayek's ﬁrst book revealed him to be also a supporter
of the fractional reserve theory of banking (Hayek, 1929, p. 90): He ar-
gued that with a reserve of 10%, every bank would lend out 90% of any
deposit, which would increase deposits with other banks, resulting in
a multiple creation of deposits in the banking system.
Meanwhile, Keynes (1930) supports the fractional reserve theory, cit-
ing both Phillips (1920) and Crick (1927) approvingly (p. 25). But he
then discusses the concept of money ‘creation’ by referring to any in-
crease in bank deposits as the ‘creation’ of deposits:
“There can be no doubt that, in themost convenient use of language,
all deposits are ‘created’ by the bank holding them. It is certainly not
the case that the banks are limited to that kind of deposit, for the cre-
ation of which it is necessary that depositors should come on their
own initiative bringing cash or cheques” (p. 30).
Keynesmayhave been referring to bank transfers as the kind of depos-
it that allows a bank to ‘create’ a deposit, while remaining amere ﬁnancial
intermediary, since Keynes (1930) deploys the expression ‘creation of de-
posits’ also for the instance of a cash deposit at a bank (p. 24), arguing that:
“only the bank itself can authorise the creation of a deposit in its
books entitling the customer to draw cash or to transfer his claim
to the order of someone else” (p. 24).
Table 4c
Original bank in ﬁnal position.
Table 4i
Consolidated balance sheet showing ﬁnal positions of all banks together.
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simply the act of recording a deposit in the bank's account, i.e. a bank ac-
counting entry. If the adjustment of an account is termed the ‘creation’
of such an accounting record, by this deﬁnition banks are of course
‘creating’ entries whenever a transaction is made. However, by this def-
inition any non-bank corporationwould equally be ‘creating’ assets and
liabilities on its balance sheet, whenever a transaction is entered into
the ﬁrm's accounts. Thus Keynes' terminology does not serve to clarify.
Thewidely read contemporary textbook by Stiglitz (1997) also favours
the fractional reserve theory, andmirrors Keynes' ambiguous terminology:
“The process of multiple-deposit creation may seem somewhat like
a magician pulling rabbits out of a hat: it seems to make something
out of nothing. But it is, in fact a real physical process. Deposits are
created by making entries in records; today electronic impulses cre-
ate records on computer tapes. The rules of deposit creation are rules
specifyingwhen youmaymake certain entries in the books. It is the-
se rules – in particular, the fractional reserve requirements – that
give rise to the system's ability to expand deposits by a multiple of
the original deposit increase”
(Stiglitz, 1997, p. 737).
Again, the ‘creation’ of deposits and loans is deﬁned by the creation
of an accounting record. Such terminology distracts from the question
whether individual banks can uniquely create new purchasing power
out of nothing, and hence cause an increase in total balances without
a commensurate decrease. But at least Stiglitz's adherence to the frac-
tional reserve theory of banking is clear-cut.
Whatmustbe themost inﬂuential post-war textbook in economics—
that by Samuelson (1948) — squarely addresses the question at hand:
The original ﬁrst edition deals with the third theory of banking, the
credit creation theory and dismisses it. Under the heading “Can banks re-
ally create money?”, Samuelson argues against “false explanations still
in wide circulation” (p. 324):
“According to these false explanations, the managers of an ordi-
nary bank are able, by some use of their fountain pens, to lend
several dollars for each dollar left on deposit with them. No won-
der practical bankers see red when such behavior is attributed to
them. They only wish they could do so. As every banker well
knows, he cannot invest money that he does not have; and any
money that he does invest in buying a security or making a loan
will soon leave his bank” (p. 324).
Samuelson also supports the fractional reserve theory of banking and
holds that a bank needs to gather the funds ﬁrst, before it can extend
bank loans. At the same time he argues that, in aggregate, the banking
system creates money. He illustrates his argument with the example of
a ‘small bank’ that faces a 20% reserve requirement and considers the
balance sheet accounts of the bank. If this bank receives a new cash de-
posit of $1000, “What can the bank now do?”, Samuelson asks (p. 325).
“Can it expand its loans and investments by $4000 so that the change
in its balance sheet looks as shown in Table 4b?”Table 4b
Impossible situation for single small bank.“The answer is deﬁnitely ‘no’. Why not? Total assets equal total lia-
bilities. Cash reservesmeet the legal requirement of being 20% of to-
tal deposits. True enough. But how does the bank pay for the
investments or earning assets that it buys? Like everyone else it
writes out a check – to the man who sells the bond or signs thepromissory note. … The borrower spends the money on labor, on
materials, or perhaps on an automobile. The money will very soon,
therefore, have to be paid out of the bank.… A bank cannot eat its
cake and have it too. Table 4b gives, therefore a completely false pic-
ture of what an individual bank can do” (p. 325f).
Samuelson argues that since all the money lent out will leave the
bank, after loanextension the true balance sheet of this bank that has re-
ceived a new deposit of $1000 will look as follows (Table 4c):Thus Samuelson argues that an individual bank cannot create credit
out of nothing, while the banking system can do so:
“As far as this ﬁrst bank is concerned, we are through. Its legal re-
serves are just enough to match its deposits. There is nothing more
it can do until the public decides to bring in some more money on
deposit” (p. 326).
“The banking system as awhole can dowhat each small bank cannot
do!” (p. 324),
namely createmoney. Samuelson then describes the iterative process of
a new loan by one bank becoming another bank's deposits, and so forth.
He calls this a “chain of deposit creation”, which shows total deposits in
the banking system of $5000 having come about from an initial $1000
loan, with a reserve requirement of 20%, implying a ‘money multiplier’
of 5 times. As a result the consolidated balance sheet of the banking sys-
tem is shown by Samuelson as follows (Table 4i):“If the reader will turn to Table 4b previously marked impossible, he
will see that thewhole banking system can dowhat no one bank can
do by itself. Bankmoney has been created 5 for 1 – and all the while
each bank has only invested and lent a fraction of what it has re-
ceived as deposits!” (p. 329).
Samuelson calls this “multiple deposit expansion”. This description
has survived over the decades of new editions of his textbook, with the
same heading: “All banks can do what one can't do alone” (p. 493), re-
iterated in the ﬁfteenth edition of his book (Samuelson and Nordhaus,
1995), although the reserve requirement cited as example had been
lowered to 10% (still an overstated number). The table with the
‘chain’ of n-th-generation banks to whom decreasing portions of de-
posits have moved is the same, as is the caption “All banks together
do accomplish what no one small bank can do – multiple expansion of
reserves…” (p. 492). Table 4i re-appears, with the same title (“Consoli-
dated Balance Sheet Showing Final Positions of All Banks”).
Comparing these two versions of this likely most inﬂuential eco-
nomics textbook of the 20th century (1948 vs. 1995) a number of differ-
ences can be seen: The amount of space devoted to the topic of bank
money creation is much smaller in 1995 compared to 1948. In the
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unambiguously: the central bank-created reserves are said to be used
by banks “as an input” and then “transformed” “into a much larger
amount of bank money” (p. 490). The alternative credit creation theory
is notmentioned: There is no equivalent of Table 4b. The idea that an in-
dividual bank might create deposits is not mentioned at all.4 Each bank
is clearly represented as a pure ﬁnancial intermediary, collecting de-
posits and lending out this money (minus the reserve requirement)5:
“Each small bank is limited in its ability to expand its loans and in-
vestments. It cannot lend or invest more than it has received from
depositors” (p. 496).
So in thisworld,wheredoesmoney (ourmodernbankdepositmoney)
come from?We are told that it is “supplied” by “the ﬁnancial system” in a
diffuse process that each individual bank has little control over (p. 494).
Another supporter of the fractional reserve theory, published in a lead-
ing journal, is Whittlesey (1944), who stated that banks are “creating
money” (p. 251), “exercising the sovereign function of issuing money”
(p. 252), as “administrators of themoney supply” and engage in “deposit
creation” (p. 247) – but only collectively, not individually, in linewith the
fractional reserve theory:
“Despite the changes that have taken place, the mechanics of banking
operations are essentially similar towhat theywere in thepast. Thepro-
cess, whereby deposits are created – andmay conceivably be destroyed
– on the basis of fractional reserves and against changes in the volume
of debts held by banks, is still fundamentally the same” (p. 247).
The author is aware that the policy conclusion that bank credit crea-
tion could be considered a mechanical process that did not need to be
modelled explicitly in economic theories, was dependent on a number
of assumptions:
“The rise of a large and ﬂuctuating volume of excess reserves is signiﬁ-
cant primarily because the assumption of a ﬁxed reserve ratio under-
lies, to an extent that has not, I believe, received sufﬁcient emphasis,
the entire theory of commercial banking. The conventional description
of the process of deposit expansion –with reserves overﬂowing from
Bank 1 to Bank 2 and so on up to Bank 10, thereby generating a neatly
descending series of deposit growth all along the line – rests on the
assumption that reserves will be fully and promptly utilized” (p. 250).
Alhadeff (1954), a staff member of the US Federal Reserve system,
also invokes Phillips (1920) in supporting the fractional reserve theory
of banking:
“One complication worth discussing concerns the alleged “creation” of
money by bankers. It used to be claimed that bankers could create
money by the simple device of opening deposit accounts for their busi-
ness borrowers. It has since been amply demonstrated that under a
fractional reserve system, only the totality of banks can expanddeposits
to the full reciprocal of the reserve ratio. [Footnote: ‘Chester A. Phillips,
Bank Credit (NewYork:Macmillan Committee, 1931), chapter 3, for the
classical refutation of this claim.’] The individual bank can normally
expand to an amount about equal to its primary deposits” (p. 7).
The fractional reserve theory of banking is proposed in many text-
books, especially for undergraduate students (interestingly, it tends to4 Furthermore, unlike the original Samuelson (1948), the more recent textbook men-
tions nowhere that in terms of its operations an individual bankmight also be able to ‘cre-
ate deposits’ (even though it might then lose the money quickly), which can be said,
somewhat contradictorily, to support the credit creation theory.
5 Moreover, the original Samuelson (1948: 331) offered an important (even though not
prominently displayed) section headed ‘Simultaneous expansion or contraction by all
banks’, which provided the caveat that each individual bank could, after all, create de-
posits, if only all banks did the same at the same rate (thus outﬂows being on balance can-
celled by inﬂows, as Alhadeff, 1954, also mentioned). There is no such reference in the
modern, ‘up-to-date’ textbook.be left out of books for postgraduates, where the ﬁnancial intermediation
theory holds sway). For instance, Stiglitz (1997) writes:
“In thisway, anynewdeposit into thebanking systemresults in amul-
tiple expansion of the number of deposits. This is the ‘miracle’ of the
fractional reserve system. Deposits increase by a factor of 1/reserve re-
quirement.…Note that as the deposits increased, so did the supply of
outstanding loans” (p. 736).“It should be clear that when there are
many banks, no individual bank can create multiple deposits. Individ-
ual banksmay not even be aware of the role they play in the process of
multiple-deposit creation. All they see is that their deposits have in-
creased and therefore they are able to make more loans” (p. 737).
2.3. The credit creation theory of banking
The third theory of banking is at oddswith the other two theories by
representing banks not as ﬁnancial intermediaries — neither in aggre-
gate nor individually. Instead, each bank is said to create credit and
money out of nothingwhenever it executes bank loan contracts or pur-
chases assets. So banks donot need toﬁrst gather deposits or reserves to
lend. Since bank lending is said to create new credit and deposit money,
an increase in total balances takes place without a commensurate de-
crease elsewhere. Therefore according to this theory, over time bank
balance sheets andmeasures of themoney supply tend to show a rising
trend in time periods when outstanding bank credit grows — unlike
with the ﬁnancial intermediation theory, where only existing purchas-
ing power can be re-allocated and themoney supply does not rise. Sup-
porters include Macleod (1856), Withers (1909, 1916), Schumpeter
(1912), Wicksell (1898), Cassel (1918), Hahn (1920), Hawtrey (1919)
and others. There were more supporters of this theory in the era of
widespread bank note issuance by commercial banks, but our concern
here is with writers that considered individual banks to be creators of
credit and money even if they do not engage in note issuance.
The most authoritative writer supporting this theory is Henry D.
Macleod (1856), whowas a banking expert and barrister at law. His inﬂu-
ential work, published in many editions until well into the 20th century
(the quotes are from the 6th edition of 1906), emphasises the importance
of considering accounting, legal and ﬁnancial aspects of banking together.
Based on an analysis of the legal nature of bank activity he concluded:
“Nothing can be more unfortunate or misleading than the expres-
sion which is so frequently used that banking is only the “Economy
of Capital,” and that the business of a banker is to borrow money
fromone set of persons and lend it to another set. Bankers, no doubt,
do collect sums from a vast number of persons, but the peculiar es-
sence of their business is, not to lend that money to other persons,
but on the basis of this bullion to create a vast superstructure of
Credit; to multiply their promises to pay many times: these Credits
being payable on demand and performing all the functions of an
equal amount of cash. Thus banking is not an Economy of Capital,
but an increase of Capital; the business of banking is not to lendmoney,
but to create Credit: and bymeans of the ClearingHouse these Credits
are now transferred from one bank to another, just as easily as a
Credit is transferred from one account to another in the same bank
by means of a cheque. And all these Credits are in the ordinary lan-
guage and practice of commerce exactly equal to so much cash or
Currency (Macleod, 1906, vol. 2, p. 311, italics added)”.66 Also: “We have seen that all Banking consists in creating and issuing Rights of action,
Credit, or Debts, in exchange for Money, or Debts. When the Banker had created this Lia-
bility in his books, the customer might, if he pleased, have this Credit in the form of the
Banker's notes. London bankers continued to give their notes till about the year 1793,
when they discontinued this practice, and their customers could only transfer their Rights,
or Credit, by means of cheques. But it is perfectly manifest that the Liabilities of the Bank
are exactly the same whether they give their own notes or merely create a Deposit”
(MacLeod, 1906, p. 338).
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a Deposit. (p. 406).
“These banking Credits are, for all practical purposes, the same
as Money. They cannot, of course, be exported like money: but
for all internal purposes they produce the same effects as an
equal amount of money. They are, in fact, Capital created out
of Nothing ”
(Macleod, 1906, p. 408).
Macleod's message was spread far and wide by Withers (1909,
1916), whowas a proliﬁc writer about this topic and formany years ed-
itor of the Economist:
“In old times,when a customerwent to a banker for a loan, the bank-
er, if he agreed, handed him out so many of his own notes; now
when a customer goes to a banker for a loan, the banker gives him
a credit in his books, i.e. adds to the deposits on the liability side of
the balance sheet"7
(Withers, 1916, p. 42).
According to the credit creation theory then, banks create credit in the
form of what bankers call ‘deposits’, and this credit is money. Another
inﬂuential proponent of this theory was Schumpeter (1912):
“The function of the banker, the manufacturer of and dealer in
credit, is to select from the gamut of plans offered by entrepre-
neurs… enabling one to implement their plans and denying this
to another”8
(Schumpeter, 1912, p. 225).
Schumpeter (1954) argued against the alternative theories of
banking:
“this alters the analytic situation profoundly and makes it highly
inadvisable to construe bank credit on the model of existing funds7 “It is true that the customer does not leave the deposit there but draws cheques
against it, which he pays to people to whom he owes money. But these cheques, if paid
to recipients who also bank at the bank which has made the advance, would simply be a
transfer within the bank's own books, and the effect of the transaction upon its balance
sheet would be that it would hold among its assets an increase – if the loan was for
£100,000 – of this amount among its advances to customers; and on the liability side there
would be a similar increase in the deposits.… and ifwe could look at an aggregate balance
sheet of thewhole of the banks of the countrywe should see that any increase in loans and
advances would have this effect of increasing the deposits as long as those who receive
these banking credits make use of themby drawing cheques against them. In the compar-
atively rare caseswhere the borrowermakes use of the credit by drawing out coin or notes
from the bank, then the ﬁrst effectwould be that the bank in questionwould hold a small-
er amount of cash among its assets and a larger amount of advances to customers. But
even here the currency withdrawn would almost certainly come round again, either to
this bank or another, from the shopkeepers or other people to whom the borrower had
made payments. And so the cash resources of the banks as a whole would be restored to
the original level,while thedeposits, owing to the increase at the credit of the shopkeepers
and otherswhohadpaid themoney in,wouldbe added to the amount of the advance orig-
inally made. (p. 42f)
“Exactly the same thing happens when, for example, in times of war the banks subscribe
to loans issued by the Government, whether in the form of long-dated loans, such as the
recent War Loan, or in the form of shorter securities, such as Exchequer Bonds, Treasury
Bills or Ways and Means Advances. (p. 43).
“It follows that the common belief that a great increase in bank deposits means that the
wealth of the community has grown rapidly, and that people are saving more money
and depositingmorewith the banks is, to a certain extent, a fallacy. A rise in bank deposits,
as a rule, means that the banks aremaking large advances to their customers or increasing
their holding of securities, and so are granting a larger amount of book-keeping credit,
which appears as a liability to the public in the shape of deposits. (p. 44)
“It may be objected that the deposits have to come ﬁrst before the banks can make ad-
vances. Does this necessarily follow? (p. 44)
8 “Die Funtion des Bankiers, des Produzenten von und Händlers mit Kredit, ist in der
Fülle der sich darbietenden Unternehmerpläne eine Auswahl zu treffen, die allen
Lebensverhältnissen der Volkswirtschaft entspricht, dem einen die Durchführung zu
ermöglichen, dem andern zu versagen” (Schumpeter, 1912, S. 225). Translated by author.being withdrawn from previous uses by an entirely imaginary
act of saving and then lent out by their owners. It is much more
realistic to say that the banks ‘create credit’, that is, that they create
deposits in their act of lending, than to say that they lend the de-
posits that have been entrusted to them. And the reason for insisting
on this is that depositors should not be invested with the insignia of
a role which they do not play. The theory to which economists clung
so tenaciously makes them out to be savers when they neither save
nor intend to do so; it attributes to them an inﬂuence on the ‘supply
of credit’which they do not have. The theory of ‘credit creation’ not
only recognizes patent facts without obscuring them by artiﬁcial
constructions; it also brings out the peculiar mechanism of saving
and investment that is characteristic of fully ﬂedged capitalist socie-
ty and the true role of banks in capitalist evolution” (p. 1114).
US supporters of this theory include Davenport (1913) and Howe
(1915):
“…banks do not lend their deposits, but rather, by their own exten-
sions of credit, create the deposits”
(Davenport, 1913, p. 263).
“Banks do not loan money. They loan credit. They create this credit
and charge interest for the use of it. It is universally admitted that
the old State Banks that created credit in the form of bank notes, cre-
ated currency – and our modern system of creating credit in the
form of “Deposits”which circulate in the form of bank checks, is do-
ing exactly the same thing – creating currency.
“All this in effect nulliﬁes the National Banking Act, which pro-
vides for National Bank Currency based on U.S. Government
Bonds, and also the act levying an annual tax of 10% on all State
Bank Currency….
“The public little realizes to what an extent Bank Credit, circulating
in the form of bank checks, has supplanted all other circulating me-
dia. In 95% of all the business done in the United States, the pay-
ments are made in bank checks and in only 5% is any cash used;
and of this 5% an inﬁnitesimal fraction only is gold
(Howe, 1915, p. 24f).
“The introduction of bank notes was useful in weaning the public
from the use of gold and silver coins, and prepared the way for the
introduction of Bank Credit as the means of payment for commodi-
ties. As a result of this evolutionary process, the checks drawn and
paid in the United States amount to between two hundred billion
and two hundred and ﬁfty billion dollars a year. It is clear that it
would be a physical impossibility to do this amount of business by
the use of gold coin. There is only about eight billions of gold money
in theworld, of which amount less than two billions of dollars are in
the United States.
“The banks have created ﬁfteen billions of dollars of credit by
discounting the notes of merchants and manufacturers, and
crediting the proceeds to the borrower's account under the head of
Deposits. As a result, the borrower is enabled to draw checks and
pay his debts with them
(Howe, 1915, p. 25).
Swedish economist Gustav Cassel (1923) pointed out that
“In practice, deposits are also created and constantly fed by the
bank's granting advances to its customers, either by discounting bills
or bymaking loans and then crediting the clients with the amount in
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An important difference to the fractional reserve theory of banking is
the use of singular in the above sentence: it is one bank that is able to
create deposits. Hawtrey (1919), mirroring Macleod's (1856) exposi-
tion, also argued that banks create money out of nothing. The early
Keynes was another prominent supporter of the credit creation theory,
praising it enthusiastically in the early 1920s as an
“almost revolutionary improvement in our understanding of the
mechanism of money and credit and of the analysis of the trade cy-
cle, recently effected by the united efforts of many thinkers, and
which may prove to be one of the most important advances in eco-
nomic thought ever made”
(Keynes and Moggridge, 1983, p. 419, as quoted by Tily, 2012).
Keynes gives the impression of a recent convert whose eyes had
been opened. In his Treatise on Monetary Reform (1924) Keynes was
also unambiguous about the ability of banks to expand or diminish
“the volume of credit quoted” (p. 137):
“The internal price level is mainly determined by the amount of
credit created by the banks, chieﬂy the Big Five; … The amount of
credit, so created, is in its turn roughly measured by the volume of
the banks' deposits — since variations in this total must correspond
to variations in the total of their investments, bill-holdings, and ad-
vances” (op. cit., p. 178).
Yet, his later support for the other theories indicates that Keyneswas
not settled in his views on the credit creation theory of banking. Indeed,
there is some evidence that he may have been open to the implication
of the fractional reserve banking theory that high powered money is a
key driving factor:
“Thus in one way or another the banks generally adjust their
total creation of credit in one form or another (investments, bills,
and advances) up to their capacity as measured by the above
criterion; from which it follows that the volume of their ‘cash’ in
the shape of Bank and Currency Notes and Deposits at the Bank of
England closely determines the volume of credit which they create”
(op. cit., p. 179).
A clearer statement coming from Keynes' pen can be obtained from
the ﬁnal report of the Committee on Finance and Industry, commonly
known as the Macmillan Committee (1931), after its chairman, Hugh
Macmillan.10 The Committee gathered much evidence, mainly in the9 This quote is from the English translation of theﬁfth German edition of the 1918 book,
both published in 1932.
10 The committee was appointed by the Chancellor of the Exchequer in November 1929
to
“inquire into banking, ﬁnance and credit, paying regard to the factors both internal
and internationalwhich govern their operation, and tomake recommendations calculat-
ed to enable these agencies to promote the development of trade and commerce and the
employment of labour” (p. 1).
It consisted of leading experts, opinion-leaders and stakeholders of the day, including
John Maynard Keynes and Professor T. Gregory, professor of Banking at the LSE, treasury
and Bank of England representatives and senior executives of banks, but also a union rep-
resentative, a representative of the cooperative movement and a politician. Over almost
two years the Committee held 49 meetings and interviewed 57 witnesses, reﬂecting “a
wide and varied range of representatives of banking and ﬁnance, both in this country
and in theUnited States andGermany, aswell as of industry and commerce from the point
of view both of employers and of employed, while members of the Universities and the
Civil Service and eminent economists of diverse schools have also lent their assistance”
(p. 1). This included Mantagu Norman, the governor of the Bank of England, Professor A.
Pigou of Cambridge University, as well as senior representatives from Barclays Bank, Mid-
land Bank, Lloyds Bank, National Provincial Bank, Westminster Bank, the Scottish banks
and the Treasury, and such internationally active banking insiders as Otto Ernst Niemeyer
and Henry Strakosch.form of ﬁrst-hand eye-witness testimonies, and quickly identiﬁed
bank credit creation as a central focus of their inquiry.11 It must be con-
sidered as one of themost thorough and wide-ranging investigations of
banking and ﬁnance in the modern age conducted by such a broad
group of stakeholders. The ﬁnal report, submitted in June 1931,
contained a number of statements on the question at hand. It is said to
have been drafted and signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced by Keynes, one of the
committee members. The following statement expressly refers to bank
accounting of an individual bank:
“It is not unnatural to think of the deposits of a bank as being created
by the public through the deposit of cash representing either savings
or amountswhich are not for the time being required tomeet expen-
diture. But the bulk of the deposits arise out of the action of the banks
themselves, for by granting loans, allowingmoney to be drawn on an
overdraft or purchasing securities a bank creates a credit in its books,
which is the equivalent of a deposit” (op. cit., p. 34).
The last sentence uses the singular: a loan from one bank results in
credit creation,which is the “equivalent” of deposit creation, amounting
to the size of the loan. If the bankwas a ﬁnancial intermediary, it would
not newly create the deposit of the borrower, but transfer the funds
from another account, either inside or outside the bank. This is most
clearly seen
“If no additional in-payments were made by customers and there
were nowithdrawals in cash,” because then “the volume of deposits
of a single banker would ﬂuctuate only with the volume of the loans
he himself made…” (op. cit., p. 12).
The credit creation theory of banking also featured prominently in
textbooks, training a new generation of economists and policy makers
well into the 1930s: The US textbook on monetary economics by
James (1930) was unambiguous and conﬁdent in the assessment that
“… the bank is enabled tomake loans to an amountmany times larg-
er than the sum of cashwhich has been deposited with it, and it will
already have become apparent that the greater part of the items
appearing on the liabilities side of the balance sheet, under the heading
of deposits, is created, not as a result of cash deposited with the bank by
customers, but through the making of loans or discounts by the bank to
those customers.…”
“…the bank has monetized credit. It has created purchasing power
which did not exist before, since it has supplied the borrower with
a means of paying his debts, without in any way reducing the
amount of money in the hands of the other members of the com-
munity. Each addition to the existing volume of bank loans, there-
fore, results in a net increase in the total supply of money in the
community, and any diminution in that volume will decrease
the total volume of money”
(James, 1930, 194f, italics in original)
While the star of the credit creation theorywas on the descent in the
mid-1930s, as the fractional reserve theory becamedominant, a leading–
if not the leading-monetary economist of his day, Irving Fisher, still
insisted on the veracity of the credit creation theory:
“When a bank grants me a $1000 loan, and so adds $1000 to my
checking deposit, that $1000 of ‘money that I have in the bank’ is
new. It was freshly manufactured by the bank out of my loan and11 In his opening words to witness Josiah Stamp, chairman Lord Macmillan stated: “You
appreciate that ourmain preoccupation iswith the question of the basis of credit as affect-
ing industry and employment…” (Macmillan Committee, 1931, appendix, witness tran-
scripts, p. 238, question 3710).
12 Ryan-Collins et al. (2011) is being used as textbook, and is thus an exception.
13 As a result, in their model banks are pure intermediaries: “Intermediaries can take de-
posits from unproductive households to extend loans to entrepreneurs” (p. 6). In this
model, banks could not be anything but intermediaries, because there is no money crea-
tion whatsoever (“Assume there is a ﬁxed supply of inﬁnitely divisible money”, p. 5).
Whether such a model is appropriate for a central bank engaged in ‘quantitative easing’
is an interesting question.
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books of the bank... Except for these pen and ink records, this
‘money’ has no real physical existence”
(Fisher, 1935, p. 3).
Despite being dominated by the other two theories in subsequent
decades, pockets of adherents to the credit creation theory of banking
continued to exist and even thrive, most notably among so-called
‘Austrian’ economists (since the post-war era largely active in the US),
post-Keynesian economists and the inductive-empiricist school.
Examples of the Austrian writers whose views appear consistent
with the credit creation theory of banking are Hoppe, Hülsmann and
Block (1998). Post-Keynesian writers that have postulated the ability
of banks to create credit and money include Rochon and Rossi (2003)
and Basil Moore. The latter wrote:
“When a bank grants a loan to one of its customers, it simply credits
the amount to the borrower's account”
(Moore, 1988, p. 51).
Moore (1988) also argued against the fractional reserve theory,
although his choice of the word ‘bank intermediation’ is not ideal:
“Contrary to conventional wisdom, changes in reserve requirements
imposed by the central bank do not directly affect the volume of
bank intermediation”
(op. cit., p. 65).
Since the early 1990s, themethodological approach to base econom-
ic research not on preconceived theories (the deductive method), but
on empirically gained knowledge (the inductive method), has gained
credence (see Werner, 1992, 1997, 2005). Employing this approach,
Werner (1997) writes:
“…banks create new purchasing power by the extension of loans”
(p. 282).
Consistent with this insight, it was also suggested to deploy bank
credit information in macroeconomic models:
“Using total bank credit as themeasure of the ‘money supply’ in [the]
equation [of exchange] has the advantage that (a) credit always rep-
resents effective purchasing power, as no borrower will take out a
loan if there is no loan to use the money for transactions; (b) it be-
comes possible to deﬁne effective purchasing power clearly – namely
not bank liabilities, but bank assets or private sector liabilities to the
bank sector; and (c) credit aggregates are available by economic sec-
tor andhence provide uswith additional information about the direc-
tion of purchasing power – something deposit aggregates cannot tell
us” (op. cit., p. 283).
The empirical evidence in favour of this disaggregated Quantity The-
ory of Credit was overwhelming, when a general-to-speciﬁc downward
reduction from a general model of a major economy was conducted,
which included variables from competing theories:
“We found that key economic variables, namely nominal GDP, as-
set prices and Japanese foreign investment, could be explained
single-handedly with quantity variables – the quantity of disag-
gregated credit –while interest rates and exchange rates dropped
out in parsimonious reductions as insigniﬁcant. … This opens a
whole new avenue of promising work in the new research pro-
gramme of the macro-economic role of credit” (Werner, 1997,
p. 305).
Werner (2005) asks where a bank gets the money from which it
credits a borrower's account with:“Themoney was not withdrawn by the bank from other uses. It was
not diverted or transferred fromany other part of the economy.Most
of all, although it is shown as a deposit, it was not actually deposited
by anyone. The bank simply created the money by writing the ﬁg-
ures into its books and the customer's account book. In effect, the
bank pretends that its borrower has made a deposit that was not ac-
tually made. Unlike the textbook representation, we see that each
individual bank can thus create money when it extends a loan.
Showing this truth in textbooks would not only be more memorable,
but it would also teach students about what banks really do: they create
money out of nothing. The bank just pretends it has the [loan amounts],
credits someone's books with them, and nobody knows the difference”
(p. 178).
Finally, it should be repeated that the credit creation theory does not
feature in most contemporary economics, ﬁnance or banking
textbooks.12
2.4. Assessment
From the above review of the literature, together with that in
Werner (2014b), it can be said that despite today's dominance of
the ﬁnancial intermediation theory, the question whether banks cre-
ate money and are thus ‘unique’ still “remains unsettled”. That was
the conclusion by Guttentag and Lindsay (1968, p. 992) almost half
a century ago in their Journal of Political Economy article, and it has
remained true until recently. The situation has not been helped by
the fact that many inﬂuential economists have been sidestepping
the issue, while some eminent authors that addressed it, such as
Keynes, supported all three mutually exclusive theories at one
point or another. A new standard of ambiguity is set by the Bank of
England, which currently appears to be supporting all three theories
at the same time:
Most central banks have been active proponents and supporters of
the ﬁnancial intermediation theory of banking, helping it become domi-
nant also in the academic world over the past forty years or so. Senior
staff at the Bank of England continue to endorse it: Governor Mark
Carney (2014) in his Mais Lecture at the Cass Business School cited
the monetary theory of Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2015) in support
of his arguments. The abstract of this paper makes clear that they be-
lieve banks are ﬁnancial intermediaries that
“take deposits from…households to extend loans…” so that banks
“ﬁnance themselves by borrowing from households” (p.1).13
In late March 2014, external member of the Financial Policy
Committee of the Bank of England, Dame Clara Furse, explained:
“The ﬁnancial system performs vital functions for us all – it exists to
intermediate savings and investment… Banks, non-banks and mar-
kets all contribute to this…”
(Bank of England, 2014c).
The FPCmember argues that for economic growth to take place, bank
activity canbe substituted by ‘directﬁnance’, and she recommends, as one
of the lessons of the crisis, to enhance ‘market based ﬁnance’, i.e. funding
via channels other than banks. Other economists at the Bank of England
also seem supporters of the ﬁnancial intermediation or the fractional re-
serve theory of banking, as can be seen from theBank's forecastingmodels,
which do not include banks (Bank of England, 2014d).
Table 5
Account changes due to a €200,000 bank loan (Fractional Reserve Theory, Samuelson
Version).
Table 6
Account changes due to a €200,000 bank loan (Fractional Reserve Theory, Samuelson
Version).
Table 4
Account changes due to a €200,000 bank loan (Financial Intermediation Theory).
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ory of banking (Werner, 1992, 1997, 2005, 2012, 2014b; Ryan-Collins
et al., 2011, Benes and Kumhof, 2012), the Bank of England in March
2014 suddenly came to additionally endorse this alternative theory
(Bank of England, 2014a, b).
This means that staff at the Bank of England currently support all
three of the theories of banking at the same time (see also Zoltan and
Kumhof, 2015). Since each theory implies very different approaches to
banking policy, monetary policy and bank regulation, the Bank of
England's credibility is at stake.
One reason why the dispute still remains unsettled after such a long
time is that discussions had been based on assertions, implying different
accounting operations of banks. But the respective merit of the three
theories cannot be settled in theoretical models designed from ﬁrst
principles: theoretical worldsmight be conceivable in which each theo-
ry is plausible. Instead, the dispute can be settled through empirical ev-
idence on the actual operations and accounting practices of banking.
Surprisingly, in the observation period – from the mid-19th century
until 2014 – no scientiﬁc empirical test had been reported in the peer
reviewed journals.
The ﬁrst empirical test published in a learned journal on this issue
was Werner (2014b): With the cooperation of a bank, the operations
and accounting entries were examined that take place when a ‘live’
bank loan is granted and paid out. Only the credit creation theory was
consistent with the observed accounting records. The test design how-
ever did not allow a fully controlled environment:With bankoperations
taking place virtually 24 hours a day, it was unavoidable that other
transactions would be booked in addition to the test transaction (al-
though no other bank loan was granted). Thus a number of aggregated
uncontrolled factors had to be jointly evaluated. Therefore as a robust-
ness check it would be desirable to test the three theories of banking
using a different testing procedure, in a fully controlled environment,
without the potential interference from other transactions.
In order to allow complete control of all other factors, the IT system at
theheart of bankingoperations–which incorporates bankaccounting and
operational rules – could be taken off-line and a loan transaction could be
booked in the system.While humansmay change their behaviour in such
simulations when they become aware that a ‘mere’ test is taking place,
there is no such problem when using the regular banking software.
3. A controlled empirical test
3.1. Predictions of the three theories
Before the test is conducted, the predictions of each theory about
how the extension of a new €200,000 bank loan would be recorded
are stated for convenience:
3.1.1. Accounting implications of the ﬁnancial intermediation theory
According to this theory, banks are not different from non-bank
ﬁnancial institutions, such as stock brokers or asset management
companies, except concerning reserve requirements, capital adequa-
cy or interest rate regulations, as the casemay be. Non-bank ﬁnancial
institutions are required by Client Money rules (see CASS in FCA and
PRA, 2014) to hold deposits in custody for customers (a form of
warehousing or bailment), by placing them with other banks or the
central bank. Banks are said by this theory to be in the same position
in this respect as non-bank ﬁnancial institutions. In this case custom-
er deposits are not shown on the balance sheet as liabilities (see
Werner, 2014c). All funds are central bank money that can be held
in reserve at the central bank or deposited with other banks or ﬁnan-
cial intermediaries (where they are also held off-balance sheet).
When a loan is granted, the claim on the borrower arising from the
loan contract is shown as an increase in assets. However, the payment
of the loan involves the drawing down of funds, such as reserves held at
central banks, or client money held at other banks. According to thistheory, the bank balance sheet does not lengthen as a result of the bank
loan, just as is the case with non-bank ﬁnancial intermediaries (Table 4).3.1.2. Accounting implications of the fractional reserve theory
According to this theory each individual bank is a ﬁnancial intermedi-
ary. Funds are being treated as equivalent to cashor preciousmetals in the
sense that they are thought to have the ability to ﬂowbetween banks and
the central bank. Following Samuelson's description of the fractional re-
serve theory, new loans are granted based onnewdeposits.With a reserve
requirement of 1%, a bank would thus ﬁrst need to receive a new deposit
of €202,000 in order to extend a loan of €200,000. The bank's balance
sheet shouldﬁrst showan increase in deposits large enough to accommo-
date the loan and the reserve requirement (Table 5).As the table shows, the balance sheet increases. This is however not due
to the extension of the loan, but due to the receipt of a new deposit.
This becomes clear when breaking Samuelson's description up into two
steps— the receipt of the deposit, and the extension of the loan (Table 6).Adding up the changes in step 1 and step 2, we obtain the total
change of Table 5 above.
As can be seen, for this fractional reserve model to work, Samuelson
is assuming that the new deposit is a cash deposit, and the extension of
the loan takes the form of paying out cash. This is hardly realistic, since
bank loans are rarely paid out in cash. Amore fundamental ﬂaw is that if
each individual bank was merely a ﬁnancial intermediary, as is claimed
according to this theory, it could not actually hold client deposits on its
balance sheet — but this is what proponents of this theory have main-
tained (see the discussion of Samuelson or others above, or as shown
in Tables 5 or 6): in the UK, according to the Client Money rules, ﬁnan-
cial intermediaries have to hold client money off-balance sheet
(Werner, 2014c). This alreadymakes it clear that banks could not possi-
bly be mere ﬁnancial intermediaries and that their accounting would
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claim that only reserve requirements and interest rate regulations
(and even if updated to include capital requirements) distinguish
banks from non-banks.3.1.3. Accounting implications of the credit creation theory
According to this theory, banks do not separate customer funds from
own funds. Thus when lending, banks are able to credit the borrower's
account with the borrowed amount, although no new deposit has
taken place (credit creation out of nothing,Werner, 2014c). The balance
sheet lengthens due to the extension of the loan, while neither cash, nor
central bank reserves nor balances with other banks are needed
(reserve and capital requirements only need to be met at particular
measurement intervals and are not a physical precondition of granting
a loan). In other words, a bank can extend a new loan, even though it
has not received any new deposit money or reserves. The borrower's
account is credited with the amount of the loan, although there has
been no commensurate equal reduction in balance of any other account,
as would be the case had the funds been transferred. Thus bank loans
create new deposits, not the other way round (Table 7).Table 7
Account changes due to a €200,000 bank loan (Credit Creation Theory).To test the veracity of the three theories, the balance sheet of a bank
needs to be examined before and after the extension of a bank loan, ide-
ally under fully controlled circumstances. If the bank loan increased the
balance sheet, while no further reserve or depositmovement tookplace,
then the credit creation theory would be shown to be consistent with
the evidence, while the other two theories would be rejected.Table 8
Raiffeisenbank Wildenberg e.G.: Annual Accounts 2013, Assets.
Assets in EUR 31 Dec. 2013 Post-test Difference
1 Cash 227,072.87 227,072.87
2 Bills of exchange
3 Claims on ﬁnancial. inst. 6,123,707.01 6,123,707.01
4 Claims on customers 24,066,899.94 24,266,899.94 200,000.00
5 Bonds, bills, debt instr. 19,655,934.00 19,655,934.00
6 Stocks and shares
7 Stake holdings 397,768.68 397,768.68
8 Stakes in related ﬁrms
9 Trust assets 4,713.81 4,713.81
10 Compensation claims on the
public sector
11 Immaterial assets
12 Fixed assets 188,977.92 188,977.92
13 Other assets 335,969.95 335,969.95
14 Balancing item 2,126.22 2,126.22
15 Difference from asset valuations 46,334.50 46,334.50
16 Sum of assets 51,049,504.92 51,249,504.92 200,000.003.2. The test
The ﬁrst empirical test of the three theories of banking, reported by
Werner (2014b), involved taking out an actual bank loan from a bank
that was co-operating with the investigation and shared its internal re-
cords, so that it was possible to reconstruct how the loan extension was
accounted for. Raiffeisenbank Wildenberg e.G., a cooperative bank in
Lower Bavaria, Germany, co-headed by director Marco Rebl, kindly
cooperated in the conduct of this empirical test. As this was a ‘live
test’ and not a controlled experiment, other transactions by bank cus-
tomers continued to take place during the observation period. Due to
the facilities offered by modern 24-hour electronic banking, it is very
difﬁcult for researchers to control such a test, as other transactions are
likely to take place during the same time period.
Considering this issue, bankdirectorRebl suggested amethodof testing
which would allow the researcher to control for all other transactions
without fail. Mr. Rebl explained that all bank accounting takes placewithin
the IT system that is used on a daily basis by bank staff. Although the code
of the software would directly show the commands following the entry of
a bank loan, gaining access to the internal software code is difﬁcult even for
senior bank staff, given the high security requirements of bank IT systems
that are themselves usually offeredby external providers reluctant to allow
outsiders access to details of the software. However,Mr. Rebl then pointed
out that there are in fact two parallel IT systems in operation at all Bavarian
cooperative banks, and both contain the accounting information of each
bank. The daily balance sheet and reporting software used in the ﬁrst em-
pirical test is based on the software called ‘BAP Agree’ (Bankarbeitsplatz
Agree). This software is however not used for the compilation of the formal
annual accounts of the banks, which are submitted to bank auditors and
the regulatory authorities. For these formal accounts, a second, parallelsystem is utilised, called Hersbrucker Jahresabschlußprogramm (below
‘HJAP’; literally: Hersbruck annual accounts programme, named after the
town where the Raiffeisen cooperative bank is located whose director,
Mr. Weidinger, originally developed this programme). Mr. Rebl pointed
out that the HJAP system contains all the bank accounting rules and func-
tions, and that it conforms with all bank supervisory, prudential and legal
requirements, regulations and procedures (which may not necessarily be
relevant or enforceable on a daily basis as applied by BAP Agree in day-
to-day use). Meanwhile, HJAP meets the more stringent annual reporting
requirements and features functions that are useful for the compilation,
checking and submission of these accounts to regulators.
All transactions are aggregated in HJAP for the annual accounts at
the end of the calendar year. While transactions booked in BAP auto-
matically feed into HJAP, sometimes transactions take place late in
December that were not properly recorded or reﬂected in the BAP
Agree system, for instance due to the holidays. In this case, the bank
directors have the opportunity to ensure that these omitted transac-
tions are booked by manual entry in the HJAP system even after the
end of the calendar year.
ThusMr. Rebl suggested the following test design: using the latest an-
nual accounts (at the time of conducting the test thesewere the2013 an-
nual accounts) and using the latest HJAP software (at the time ofwriting,
2.0.2013/5), a test bank loan of €200,000 can be booked as if it was a
missed trade that had to be booked manually after 31 December 2013,
to be added to the ofﬁcial accounts for reporting purposes. Since in
this case only one transaction will be booked – the bank loan from the
researcher – there is no noise due to other autonomous transactions un-
dertaken by other bank customers. In other words, all other factors are
controlled for. Meanwhile, since the software is designed to allow such
a possibility, all standard procedures and regulations are applied and
this manual entry function in noway overrides the system, but is a reg-
ular part of it. Since the bank loan can be entered into the HJAP system
by the researcher after the endof 2013 in exactly the sameway as a gen-
uine, actual missed trade, as indeed happens on occasionwith standard
loans, this does constitute a realistic empirical test. This test design was
adopted and the procedure was implemented as suggested by Director
Rebl in 2014, using the audited accounts of 2013.
Appendix 1 shows the original audited and formally submitted ac-
counts of Raiffeisenbank Wildenberg for the year 2013. Appendix 2
shows the same accounts after the simulation bank loan of €200,000
has been transacted via the same annual reporting bank IT software
(HJAP). The summary accounts are shown (assets in Table 8 and liabil-
ities in Table 9), whereby the ﬁrst column represents the original
2013 annual accounts, the second column the new accounts after the
loan has been added, and the third column shows the Difference items
between the ﬁrst two columns.
Table 9
RaiffeisenbankWildenberg e.G.: Annual Accounts 2013, Liabilities.
Liabilities in EUR 31 Dec. 2013 Post-test Difference
1 Claims by ﬁnancial inst. 5,265,491.16 5,265,491.16
2 Claims by customers 41,462,424.00 41,662,424.00 200,000.00
2A Savings accounts 10,494,856.16 10,494,856.16
2B Other liabilities 30,967,567.84 31,167,567.84 200,000.00
BA daily 14,069,056.09 14,269,056.09 200,000.00
BB with agreed maturity 16,898,511.75 16,898,511.75
4 Trust liabilities 4,713.82 4,713.82
5 Other liabilities 33,812.09 33,812.09
6 Balancing item 12,787.37 12,787.37
7 Reserves 682,874.80 682,874.80
11 Fund for bank risk 420,000.00 420,000.00
12 Own capital 3,167,401.68 3,167,401.68
13 Sum of liabilities 51,049,504.92 51,249,504.92 200,000.00
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the claims on customers – the bank loan as a claim by the bank on the
borrower due to the borrower's obligation to repay the loan – and the
total balance of assets. Both increased by the loan amount of €200,000.
Considering liabilities in Table 9, we see that customer deposits
(‘claims by customers’) increased by €200,000 (i.e. current account
deposits — daily liabilities), as well as the balance sheet total. Thus we
conclude that the variation in accounts before and after the loan has
been extended is identical with the a priori expectation according to the
credit creation theory. As no actual deposit (or reserve increase) took
place, the fractional reserve theory is rejected. As customer deposits are
shown on the balance sheet, the ﬁnancial intermediation theory is also
rejected.14
Mr. Rebl, himself a trained bank auditor, conﬁrmed that standard
procedures had been followed and no other transaction or operation
was necessary to complete the booking of the loan and ﬁnalise the
accounts.
4. Evaluation: Lack of rigour as a cause of confusion
The core activity of banking, what is commonly called ‘receiving de-
posits’ and ‘lending’, are in actual fact the creation and maintenance of
accounting records and thus can be considered a form of applied ac-
counting. However, this feature of banking has been unduly neglected
in the treatment of banks and their impact on the economyby academic
authors, whether in journal articles, books or text books.
There are three theories of banking, with differing claims about how
bank accounting, and hence banking, operates. In this paper the results
of an empirical test were presented, whereby a loan from a bank was
booked in the bank's accounting IT system under controlled conditions
that excluded unrelated transactions. It is found that the credit creation
theory of banking is consistent with the empirical observations, while
the other two theories are not.
4.1. Flaws of the ﬁnancial intermediation theory
The ﬁnancial intermediation theory argues that banks are indistin-
guishable in their accounting from non-bank ﬁnancial intermediaries
(Tobin or others have argued that reserve requirements, regulations of
interest rates, and capital requirements are the sole distinguishing
feature of banks).
Stock brokers do not show their clients' assets, even if invested by
themon a discretionary basis, as part of their own balance sheets. The as-
sets owned by mutual fund management ﬁrms and the assets of their14 The test outcome is in line with the assessment by the Macmillan Committee (1931),
which predicted what such a controlled experiment would yield:
“If no additional in-payments were made by customers and there were no with-
drawals in cash, the volume of deposits of a single banker would ﬂuctuate only with
the volume of the loans he himself made…” (p. 12).fund investor clients are kept completely separately. Stock brokers' as-
sets are boosted by their own investments, but not those of their clients.
Thus an insolvency of a stock broker or fundmanagementﬁrm leaves cli-
ent funds unencumbered: they are fully owned by the clients. But bank
‘deposits’ are owned by the banks and bank insolvency means that the
client funds are part of the assets of the bankrupt ﬁrm. Depositors are
merely general creditors, ranking ahead of shareholders (although
smaller amounts may be covered by deposit insurance schemes, which
is a separate issue). However, due to the new Bail-In regime agreed by
the G20 in 2010, depositorsmay rank below other creditors. Thus a com-
parative analysis of stock brokers (as representative examples of non-
bankﬁnancial intermediaries) and banks reveals that banks are different
from non-banks, because they do not segregate client assets (Werner,
2014c).
Since non-bank ﬁnancial intermediaries, which can also gather
deposits, have to follow the Client Money rules and keep customer
deposits off their balance sheet, deposited safely with custodians, an
equal treatment for banks would mean that banks would also have to
conform to Client Money rules. As a result, bank deposits would not
appear on the bank's balance sheet. In reality they do, however, appear
on bank balance sheets with their creation, contributing to the phenom-
enal growth in bank assets in the recent decades. Thus the critical
distinguishing feature of banks is their exemption from Client Money
rules and hence ability to control the accounting records of customers'
deposits, enabling them to add ﬁctitious deposits when extending a
loan (Werner, 2014c). A rigorous application of basic accounting and ﬁ-
nancial regulation would have provided ample notice to supporters of
the ﬁnancial intermediation theory, so dominant over the past half-
century, that this theory has always been a non-starter, since banks
could not possibly be ﬁnancial intermediaries: how else could the rapid
growth and massive scale of their own balance sheets be explained?
Alas, it seems researchers in banking, ﬁnance and economics have woe-
fully neglected basic accounting realities and easily observable facts.
4.2. Flaws of the fractional reserve theory
The fractional reserve theory maintains that banks are ﬁnancial in-
termediaries that can only lend out money previously deposited with
them. According to this theory, a prior customer deposit or an increase
in reserves are the necessary step for a bank to be able to extend a
loan, and this is effectively assumed to take the form of a cash deposit
by a customer. This produces an excess cash reserve, which is then
used to fund a loan. The borrower is then assumed to receive the loan
in the form of cash, drawing down the excess cash balance.
As it turns out, this theory neglects, despite its rhetorical awareness
of the ‘creation of accounting records’, the very transaction of booking a
loan on the bank's balance sheet: the borrower's account is not shown,
as it is simply assumed that the money ‘leaves the bank immediately’,
on the implicit assumption that the loan is paid out in cash. But normally
banks will not extend a loan to a customer who has not opened an ac-
count with the bank. Loan applicants typically ﬁrst have to apply for a
bank account. The due diligence and credit checks that are always ap-
plied before a loan is extended are usually linked to the vetting proce-
dures for opening a bank account. Even borrowers that wish to receive
their loan in cash will normally ﬁrst have to open a bank account, and
will ﬁrst receive the loan as a credit in their bank account.
Let us therefore consider the standard case that the borrower re-
ceives the loan as credit to the borrower's cheque account at the bank.
We now revisit the scenario laid out by Paul Samuelson, receiver of
the Swedish Central Bank Prize in Economic Sciences in Honour of
Alfred Nobel: As shown in Table 10, Step 1, the receipt of the assumed
cash deposit causes the accounting entries as shown by Samuelson.
However, in Step 2, the bank customer receiving the loan causes a fur-
ther increase in assets, as the loan contract is signed and acquired by
the bank, and in liabilities, as the borrower's account is credited with
the sumof the loan (instead of the cash payment shown by Samuelson).
15 Authors that had recognised the ﬂaws in the fractional reserve theory include Charles
Goodhart (1984): “The use of the money multiplier identity obscures, rather than illumi-
nates…” (p. 199); Basil Moore (1988): “the notion of a money-multiplier identity is seri-
ously deﬁcient as an analytical concept” (p. 70); RichardWerner (2005): “…we conclude
that the textbook representation of the actions of each bank is inaccurate” (p. 176).
Table 10
Reconsidering Samuelson's description of the Fractional Reserve Theory.
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that the cash deposit of Step 1 is entirely irrelevant, and can be eliminat-
ed in an exposition of a bank's extension of loans. And then it becomes
clear that Samuelson's example collapses to Step 2, which is identical
with the credit creation theory of banking.
So by simply dropping the highly unrealistic assumption that loans
are paid out in cash, we are back at the credit creation theory: the asset
side expands by the amount of the loan (reﬂecting the loan contract)
and so does the liability side, as the borrower's account is credited.
Samuelson based his exposition on amisleading and incorrect repre-
sentation of bank procedures. In addition, his theory is inconsistent:
while each bank is said to be just a ﬁnancial intermediary, deposits
with banks appear on the banks' balance sheet, although non-bank ﬁ-
nancial intermediaries, as discussed, do not own deposits by customers,
and hence these cannot be shown on their balance sheet. Since however
Samuelson shows the deposits on the bank's balance sheet, they cannot
be a bailment or held in custody – off-balance sheet items – but are the
property of the bank. This means that each bank is not a ﬁnancial inter-
mediary. Bank deposits, unlike deposits with non-banks, are merely a
record of a loan to the bank. Thus a further inconsistency is that it is a
priori not clear why customer deposits or reserves should be any con-
straint on bank lending as claimed by the fractional reserve theory:
since deposits are a record of the bank's debt to customers, the bank is
not restricted to lending only asmuch as its excess reserves or prior cus-
tomer deposits allow. It can extend a loan and record further debts to
customers, shown as newly created deposits (as the credit creation the-
ory states).
So despite Samuelson's (1948) protestation that “A bank cannot eat
its cake and have it too” (p. 325f), we see that in Table 10 (Total) the
bank still has all its reserves and deposits at the moment it has granted
the bank loan and credited the borrower's account. In other words, in-
stead of being a necessary requirement as claimed by Samuelson's the-
ory, the prior receipt of new funds is unnecessary in order for the bank
to extend the loan. A careful examination of the relevant accounting
and regulations involved should have made this clear to supporters
of the fractional reserve theory and the many lecturers who over the
past decades have been teaching economics using the Samuelson
tract. The argument that the newly created deposit entry of the
borrower will ‘soon leave the bank’ also does not change the results:
in this case, in practice, the bank simply swaps a liability to the
borrower (the newly created deposit) with a liability to a bank (thebank of the receiver of the payment made by the borrower from
their newly created deposit) or the central bank (e.g. in case new
central bank promissory notes, a.k.a. paper money or bank notes,
are ordered). In either case, the balance sheet total remains un-
changed, in its lengthened form.
Thus the accounting representations of both the fractional reserve
and the ﬁnancial intermediation theories of banking, whereby each bank
is considered an intermediary, are deeply ﬂawed: either each lender is
a bank and hence able to create money due to the very fact that it
does not have to hold client funds outside theﬁrm, or theﬁrm is a ﬁnan-
cial intermediary and not a bank, in which case the client funds do not
appear on the ﬁrm's balance sheet at all.
For over a century no proponent of the fractional reserve or ﬁnancial
intermediation theories seems to have ever thought through the ac-
counting implications – and contradictions – of these theories. We con-
clude that a greater emphasis on bank accounting and a more careful
consideration of its implications should have raised serious doubts
about the theoretical viability and consistency of both the fractional
reserve and the ﬁnancial intermediation theories much earlier, even
without our conclusive empirical test.
Given the above analysis we can conﬁdently say that the fractional
reserve theory of banking in its textbook application, including the
‘money multiplier’ approach, is wrong. This may explain why it has
been quietly dropped in textbooks over the past decade or so.15 But
the ﬁnancial intermediation theory of banking is equally wrong, despite
being supported by the many leading economists cited in the literature
review above, who use it as the foundation of their work in this area,
and for their policy recommendations.
4.3. Accounting for the steps after the loan has been spent
“Bank credit creation does not matter, since banks will gradually lose
the deposits.” — This argument is often used to defend the fractional re-
serve or ﬁnancial intermediation theories. However, banking operates
within a closed accounting system: Deposits are bank liabilities and
thus can only stay bank liabilities, on the balance sheet of a bank, even
after transfer. They are a record of what Bank A owes, and the creditor
(in this case, ironically, the borrower of the loan) can re-assign this
debt of Bank A to some other bank. But of course it stays the debt of
bank A (see Werner, 2014c). So deposits ‘lost’ can only go to other
banks, and thus become an inter-bank liability. In other words, once a
deposit has been created and transferred to another bank (Bank B), in
this instance the ﬁrst bank (Bank A) has received a loan from Bank B.
If the receiver bank B is willing to ‘accept’ the transfer of the deposit,
this is equivalent to the receiver Bank B giving credit to the ﬁrst Bank
A. So the balance sheet of the ﬁrst Bank A only reﬂects a swap of a ‘cus-
tomer deposit’ for a liability to another bank. Sorting out and netting
such interbank liabilities is the original raison d'être of the interbank
market. As long as banks create credit at the same rate as other banks,
and as long as customers are similarly distributed, the mutual claims
of banks on each otherwill be netted out andmaywell, on balance, can-
cel each other out. Then banks can increase credit creationwithout limit
and without ‘losing any money’. This has been recognised even by sup-
porters of the fractional reserve theory of banking: Samuelson (1948)
mentions – though fails to emphasise – that banks do not lose any re-
serveswhen they all create credit at the samepace andhave equally dis-
persed customers. It is a mystery why Samuelson did not recognise this
as approximating the standard case, and instead chose to highlight a hy-
pothetical and highly unusual special case where a bank will pay out a
Table 11
How to create your own capital: Credit Suisse in 2008.
£bn.
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even more mysterious why later editions of this most inﬂuential text-
book dropped out this section on the netting of interbank liabilities
and consequent money creation by the banking system without direct
restraint from reserves.
5. Implications for bank regulation
The implications of our empirical ﬁndings are far-reaching for bank
regulation and the design of ofﬁcial policies. Bank regulation is based
on the prevailing understanding of the role of banks. During the past
forty years when the ﬁnancial intermediation theory of banking has
been dominant, bank regulation has focused on capital adequacy.
During the earlier thirty years or so, when the fractional reserve theory
of banking was dominant, reserve requirements featured as the main
way to regulate bank activity. Neither has been successful.
5.1. Regulation via reserve requirements
Bank regulation centred on reserve requirements was based on, and
theoretically supported by, the fractional reserve theory of banking. It was
found, however, that this regulatory policywas impracticable for central
banks to operate (Goodhart, 1989). In this paper we have identiﬁed just
why this had to be the case: the fractional reserve theory of banking is
wrong. An analysis of bank accounting shows that banks' reserves
with the central bank never leave the accounts of the central bank:
like ‘deposits’ of the public with banks (which in reality are simply re-
cords of units of accounting money owed by banks to the public), ‘re-
serves’ by banks at the central bank are simply accounting records of
money units owed by the central bank to the banks. Such indebtedness
does not directly result in money circulating in the economy, except
when it is due to a demand for legal tender cash (Ryan-Collins et al.,
2011). To make central bank expansionary monetary policies more ef-
fective, it would thus be sensible to expand the role of cash —
although, surprisingly, today central bankers are calling for its abolition
(Haldane, 2015). As reserve requirements were not an effective policy
tool, they have gradually been de-emphasised. Some central banks,
such as the Bank of England and the Swedish Riksbank, have abolished
reserve requirements altogether.
5.2. Regulation via capital adequacy
In parallel with the policy to de-emphasise reserve requirements in
bank regulation, central banks, via their inﬂuence on the Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision, have shifted towards regulating
banks using capital ratios. This approach is predicated on the veracity
of the ﬁnancial intermediation theory, which had been increasingly sup-
ported by central banks. As ﬁnancial intermediaries, banks cannot, indi-
vidually or in aggregate, increase the money supply available as
potential bank capital. Hence imposing capital requirements on banks
appears to be a viable way to keep their actions within limits. The con-
tradiction is that, if banks were only ﬁnancial intermediaries, their ac-
tions could hardly have a signiﬁcant macroeconomic impact in any
case, rendering such regulation unnecessary. It seems, once again fun-
damental facts concerning banking have been overlooked.
In reality the money supply is “created by banks as a byproduct of
often irresponsible lending”, as journalist Martin Wolf called it (Wolf,
2013). Thus the ability of capital adequacy ratios to rein in expansive
bank credit behaviour is limited: imposing higher capital requirements
on banks will not necessarily stop a boom-bust cycle and prevent the16 In the words of Moore (1988):
“While an individual bank will gradually lose the primary deposits created by its loan,
provided that it just keep pacewith the rate of loan expansion of its competitors itwill
gain secondary deposits from the recipients of their borrowers, so that no net outﬂow
of funds at clearing need result” (p. 68).subsequent banking crisis, since even with higher capital requirements,
banks could still continue to expand themoney supply, thereby fuelling
asset prices: Some of this newly created money can be used to increase
bank capital (Werner, 2010). Thiswas demonstrated during the 2008 ﬁ-
nancial crisis.
5.2.1. How to create your own capital: the Credit Suisse case study
The link between bank credit creation and bank capital was most
graphically illustrated by the actions of the Swiss bank Credit Suisse in
2008. This incident has produced a case study that demonstrates how
banks as money creators can effectively conjure any level of capital,
whether directly or indirectly, therefore rendering bank regulation
based on capital adequacy irrelevant: Unwilling to accept public
money to shore up its failing capital, as several other major UK and
Swiss banks had done, Credit Suisse arranged in October 2008 for Gulf
investors (mainly from Qatar) to purchase in total over £7 billion
worth of its newly issued preference shares, thus raising the amount
of its capital and thereby avoiding bankruptcy. A similar share issue
transaction by Barclays Bank was “a remarkable story of one of the
most important transactions of the ﬁnancial crisis, which helped
Barclays avoid the need for a bailout from the UK government”. The details
remain “shrouded in mystery and intrigue” (Jeffrey, 2014) in the case of
Barclays, but the following facts seem undisputed and disclosed in the
case of Credit Suisse, as cited in the press (see e.g. Binham et al., 2013):
The Gulf investors did not need to take the trouble of making liquid
assets available for this investment, as Credit Suisse generously offered
to lend the money to the Gulf investors. The bank managed to raise its
capital through these preference shares. Table 11 illustrates this capital
bootstrapping (not considering fees and interest).Since it is now an established fact that banks newly invent themoney
that is ‘loaned’ by creating it out of nothing, the loan to the Gulf investor
created (in step 1) a simultaneous asset and liability on the bank's bal-
ance sheet, whereby the customer's borrowedmoney appears as the ﬁc-
titious customer deposit on the liability side, of £7bn. Considering the
same change in step 2, but now after the liability swap, we see that the
newly issued preference shares boost equity capital: They are paid for
with this ﬁctitious customer deposit, simply by swapping the £7bn
from item ‘customer deposit’ to item ‘capital’. Credit Suisse is then able
to report a signiﬁcant rise in its equity capital, and hence in its capital/
asset ratio. Where did the additional £7bn in capital come from? Credit
Suisse had lent it to the investor, using its own preference shares as collat-
eral, and hence had invented its own capital. The risk to the borrower was
also limited if the Credit Suisse shares, not other assets, served as collateral.
As has been pointed out (Werner 2014c), in the UK such actions
would be illegal, as they violate Section 678 of the Companies Act
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pany). However, the Swiss regulators were happy to tolerate this. The
transgression is clearly graver in the case of a bank, compared to an or-
dinary ﬁrm lending to an investor to purchase the ﬁrm's shares: Credit
Suisse had not merely lent a prospective shareholder the funds to buy
its shares, but it created the funds out of nothing. A very similar transac-
tion involving similar amounts and also Qatar as investor is alleged to
have been undertaken by Barclays Bank in the UK, allegedly also involv-
ing an upfront 'fee' paid to Qatar of £322m, which could be a refund of
the interest on the loan. The role of interest is a topic not discussed in
detail in this article. In such a transaction, Barclays would likely need
to charge interest on the loan, in order for it to appear as a regular
deal. If the Gulf investor was acting as a strawman for what amounts
to an internal accounting exercise to create the bank's own capital out
of thin air, a part or all of this fee could have been the refund of the in-
terest on the loan, so that the investorwould not even have to pay inter-
est for receiving the newly created money and with it the preference
shares.
According to analysts at Italian bankMediobanca, such bank loans to
new bank share investors were a "fairly common practice... during the
crisis", whereby Credit Suisse may have been unusual in disclosing
this and obtaining regulatory approval. Either way, banks in this way
created their own capital out of nothing, thus making nonsense of cap-
ital adequacy regulations.
We learn from this that under the right circumstances it is possible
even for an individual bank to showalmost any amount of capital to reg-
ulators. It is evenmore easily possible for thewhole banking system col-
lectively to do likewise, without directly contravening the Companies
Act. Since during boom times an increasing amount of money is created
by banks (hence the boom), some of that can be siphoned off by banks
to bolster their capital by issuing new equity. The regulators seem un-
aware of this fact, as their descriptions of banking reveal them to be ad-
herents of the erroneous ﬁnancial intermediation theory of banking.
5.3. Empirically successful bank regulation
Having brieﬂy discussed historically unsuccessful bank regulation, it
remains to be stated that there is a formof bank regulation that has been
empirically successful. Not surprisingly, this form of bank regulation
was based on a recognition of the veracity of the credit creation theory
of banking:Many central banks have successfully avoided banking crises
for several decades by imposing regulations on banks concerning the
quantity and allocation of bank credit. Known as 'credit guidance' or
'window guidance', such policies have also been at the heart of the
high growth in the successful East Asian economies such as Japan,
Korea, Taiwan and China (Werner, 2002, 2003, 2005). Using such guid-
ance, bank credit for non-GDP (i.e. asset) transactions could be sup-
pressed, so that asset bubbles and subsequent banking crises were
avoided. When instead bank credit was guided towards productive
use, high, stable and non-inﬂationary economic growth could be
achieved, as the Quantity Theory of Credit (Werner, 1997, 2005) sug-
gests. An alternative approach to avoiding asset bubbles and banking
crises and stimulating high and stable growth has been demonstrated
in Germany, where the structure of the banking sector – consisting
largely of many small not-for-proﬁt banks – produced this result.
6. Implications for development policies
The ﬁndings also have broader implications for policies to ensure
economic growth and minimise unemployment, as well as policies for
developing countries concerning the question of how to maximise sus-
tainable growth.
As was noted above, the Keynesian growth models by Harrod
(1939) and Domar (1947), following the ﬁnancial intermediation theory
of banking, argue that savings are necessary for investment and hence
economic growth. These theories have, together with more recenttheories, been deployed by the IMF and the World Bank in their policy
advice to developing countries to obtain the allegedly ‘necessary’ sav-
ings for investment and economic growth from foreign lenders, and to
substitute for their lacking ‘domestic savings’. The international banks
usually came on the heels of theWashington institutions and, whenev-
er a developing country had resources or attractive assets, were keen to
lend.
As a result, a large number of developing countries, as well as transi-
tion economies and emergingmarkets have accumulated large amounts
of foreign debt. This debtwas invariably denominated in foreign curren-
cy and needs to be serviced at interest. This suggests that the sophisti-
cated international banks felt that the developing countries are far
better at hedging currency risk than they are.
This was not the case: since most of the indebted countries are com-
modity exporters, in the long-run (over a century or so) their terms of
trade tend to fall (as the relative price of their exports declines over
time compared to the relative price of their imports — since relative
prices are a function of value added, with high value added exports
over time becoming more expensive in relative terms and low value
added exports becoming cheaper, see Prebisch, 1950, and Singer,
1950). Thus over time their currencies can be expected to decline, com-
pared to the US dollar or European currencies. Therefore the advice to
borrow in foreign currency was not in the interest of the borrowers. In
domestic currency terms their foreign debt and payments to service
them hence rose over time. Meanwhile, ﬁxed exchange rate systems
are not likely to remain sustainable, if there is substantial foreign bor-
rowing, as the Asian crisis has shown.
The large and rising amounts of payments to service their foreign debt
may explain what otherwise is a puzzle in economic theory, namely why
international ﬁnancial ﬂows seem to be directed from poor countries to
rich countries (theory predicts the opposite, due to the yield differential,
see Lucas, 1990). As a result, a transfer of net resources from the lesswell-
off countries to the rich countries has been taking place, putting the for-
mer ever more at the mercy of the latter. (As long as this process con-
tinues the residents of the less well-off countries have an incentive to
vote with their feet, and migrate to the richer countries, if they are
allowed to).
This article and Werner (2000, 2014b) have demonstrated that the
justiﬁcation for this approach to economic development is ﬂawed.
Worse,when considering thebank accounting reality of such internation-
al borrowing it emerges that it has been one cruel trick on developing
countries: Inmany, if notmost cases, the countries would have been bet-
ter off by not borrowing from abroad at all. The foreign money never en-
tered their economies: the accounting reality of international banking
shows that US dollars stay in the US banking system, and euros stay in
the European banking system. Bank money stays within the respective
banking system of the currency of denomination. (This is also true
for foreign currency accounts or mortgages offered by banks: in
these cases, respective balances are recorded in accounts with over-
seas correspondent banks.) In other words, the dollars that created
the ‘Third World Debt’ problem never even entered the borrowing
countries. If and when such foreign currencies are exchanged by de-
veloping countries into domestic currency, they will merely result in
an increase in credit creation by the domestic banking system,
denominated in domestic currency. However, this is something any
developing country can arrange for without the need to borrow
from abroad at all (Werner, 2000, 2003a).
So the advice to borrow from abroad was largely against the inter-
ests of the developing countries: it exposed these countries to foreign
currency risk, often resulting in mounting debt and interest outﬂows
in excess of any loans received. But it triggered such ‘solutions’ to the
problem as debt for equity swaps, handing over national assets to
the foreign lenders. Bankers suggesting debt relief, such as Alfred
Herrhausen, head of Deutsche Bank, were unpopular with their col-
leagues. To add insult to injury, it is now established that the foreign
loans were not necessary for domestic growth, after all: the foreign
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creation, something the borrowers could have done themselves at
home without the foreign loans.
The alternative to this Washington Consensus approach to
‘aiding’ developing countries has been showcased in East Asia. The
highly successful economies of Japan, Taiwan, Korea and China all
used mechanisms to guide domestic bank credit to productive use,
funding import substituting domestic and exporting industries, as
discussed above in section 5.3. The ﬁndings in this paper provide
fundamental support for this argument.
The ﬁndings are of equal relevance for developed economies. Coun-
tries such as Japan, Spain or Greece have been experiencing low nomi-
nal GDP growth. Applying the knowledge of bank credit creation to
ﬁscal policy, an important lesson is that the method of funding govern-
ment expenditure can have a signiﬁcant impact on the effectiveness of
ﬁscal policy. As Werner (2014a) shows, governments can enhance the
degree of stimulation achieved by any given ﬁscal policy, if the source
of government funding is changed from bond issuance to borrowing
from banks. The latter expands themoney supply and results in growth
of nominal GDP and tax revenues.
7. Implications for economics
How is it possible that for the largest part of the past century errone-
ous and misleading theories have dominated the economics discipline?
This is a topic for future research, and only two avenues will be brieﬂy
explored here: the role of research methodology, and the role of inter-
ested parties.
7.1. Methodology in economics
Classical and neo-classical economics, as dominant today, has used
the deductive methodology: Untested axioms and unrealistic assump-
tions are the basis for the formulation of theoretical dream worlds that
are used to present particular ‘results’. As discussed in Werner (2005),
this methodology is particularly suited to deriving and justifying
preconceived ideas and conclusions, through a process of working back-
wards from the desired ‘conclusions’, to establish the kind of model that
can deliver them, and then formulating the kind of framework that
could justify this model by choosing suitable assumptions and ‘axioms’.
In other words, the deductive methodology is uniquely suited for ma-
nipulation by being based on axioms and assumptions that can be pick-
ed at will in order to obtain pre-determined desired outcomes and
justify favoured policy recommendations. It can be said that the deduc-
tive methodology is useful for producing arguments thatmay give a sci-
entiﬁc appearance, but aremerely presenting a pre-determined opinion.
Werner (2005) argues that research in economics and ﬁnance
should instead be based on a rigorous application of the scientiﬁc induc-
tive methodology. This will ensure that empirically-based and scientiﬁc
research is produced, which is far less prone to be inﬂuenced by prior
political views of the authors than is the case with research based on
the deductive methodology. Needless to mention, it is the inductive
methodology that has led to the research presented in this paper.
7.2. Information management
Progress in economics and ﬁnance research would require re-
searchers to build on the correct insights derived by economists at
least since the 19th century (such as Macleod, 1856). The overview of
the literature on how banks function, in this paper and in Werner
(2014b), has revealed that economics and ﬁnance as research disci-
plines have on this topic failed to progress in the 20th century. The
movement from the accurate credit creation theory to themisleading, in-
consistent and incorrect fractional reserve theory to today's dominant,
yet wholly implausible and blatantly wrong ﬁnancial intermediation
theory indicates that economists and ﬁnance researchers have notprogressed, but instead regressed throughout the past century. That
was already Schumpeter's (1954) assessment, and things have since
further moved away from the credit creation theory.
The analysis of the fractional reserve and ﬁnancial intermediation
theories in this paper and in Werner (2014b) provides indications that
attempts were made to obfuscate, as if authors were at times wilfully
trying to confuse their audience and lead them away from the impor-
tant insight that each individual bank creates new money when it ex-
tends credit. An examination of his 1948 textbook suggests that
Samuelson was more aware of the power of individual banks to create
money than later authors, but he chose to distract from this fact with
unrealistic special cases. But also Keynes did much to regress the disci-
pline, with his followers Tobin and others spearheading the promulga-
tion of the ﬁnancial intermediation theory of banking, so that even the
fractional reserve theory disappeared from sight, and banks became
mere ﬁnancial intermediaries also in aggregate. Many economists
appear to have been aware of the fact that banks create money out of
nothing, but chose to de-emphasise it, or even produce analysis that
contradicts it. Joseph Stiglitz, whose textbook emphasises the fractional
reserve theory, in 2003 conceded - only brieﬂy and almost hidden at the
very end of his co-authored book‐ that
“When a bank extends a loan, it creates a deposit account, increasing
the supply of money. … the creation of money and the creation of
credit occur together”
(Stiglitz and Greenwald, 2003, p. 295).
Yet, this insight was not visibly applied in their book. Moreover, on
the samepage the authors appear to erroneously believe that this ability
to create money is not unique to banks:
“Attempts to restrict banksmay simply divertmore of the credit cre-
ation activities to non-bank sources of credit”
(op. cit., p. 295).
That such important insights as bank credit creation could be made
to disappear from the agenda and even knowledge of the majority of
economists over the course of a century delivers a devastating verdict
on the state of economics and ﬁnance today. As a result, the public un-
derstanding of money has deteriorated aswell. Today, the vast majority
of the public is not aware that the money supply is created by banks,
that banks do not lend money, and that each bank creates new money
when it extends a loan.
The question whether the sequential introduction of the incorrect
fractional reserve andﬁnancial intermediation theories of banking– lead-
ing the student ever further away from the truth –was intentional or not
requires further research. Such research should focus on the role of inter-
ested parties, especially that of internationally active banks, central banks
and privately funded think tanks, in inﬂuencing academic discourse. It is
worrying, for instance, that the topic of bank credit creation has been a
virtual taboo for the thousands of researchers of the world's central
banks during the past half century. As Cheng and Werner (2015) show,
among the 3882 research papers produced and made available online
by ﬁve major central banking research outlets (Federal Reserve Board
Washington, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Bank of Japan,
European Central Bank, Bank of England) in the two decades to 2008,
only 19 articles even included the words ‘credit creation’. Of these, only
3 seemed to use the term in the correct sense of bank creation of credit
and money. On the other hand, experienced central bankers aware of
the importance of bank credit creation have spoken out about this topic
after leaving the central bank (Kure, 1975; Werner, 2003a). Why have
central banks –where the largest number of experts on this topic could
be expected to work – singularly failed to even research this topic,
let alone formulate and crystallise useful policy recommendations from
it? A former central banker in a rare frank interview discusses this issue
(Werner, 2003b, Ishii and Werner, 2003) and suggests that central
banks have been engaging in ‘information management’, by purposely
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the research topics and check, modify and censor articles written by the
central bank researchers before delivering them to the public. In this pro-
cess, what is considered a ‘harmful truth’ gets weeded out, while what is
considered useful for the central bank remains. In other words, the pub-
lications of central banks must be considered biased. Considering these
facts, one is left to wonder whether the actual goals of central banks are
the right ones, and whether the research they publish is useful.
It is also a relevant subject of future research to investigate how
central banks have exerted inﬂuence over the research conducted by
academics. For instance, the Swedish central bank established a
pseudo-‘Nobel Prize’ by awarding substantial sumsofmoney to selected
economists – none of them supporters of the credit creation theory of
banking – and calling this prize the ‘Riksbank [Swedish central bank]
prize in economic sciences in honour of Alfred Nobel’. The fact that
journalists would abbreviate this as a ‘Nobel Prize’ in their reporting of
the award could neither have been a surprise nor unwelcome to the
Swedish central bank, which lobbied for the involvement of the Nobel
Foundation in the award of this prize. Through the award of this central
bank prize, a particular branch of economics, usually based on the deduc-
tive methodology, received a signiﬁcant boost internationally. It is no-
ticeable that a number of authors implicated in leading the public away
from the credit creation reality of banking have been receivers of this
Swedish central bank prize (including Samuelson, Tobin and Krugman).
Meanwhile, investigative journalists have pointed out that the edito-
rial boards of leading journals in economics and especially monetary
economics are staffed by current or former employees of and consul-
tants to central banks, particularly the US central bank.17
More research on the ‘information management’ policies of central
banks, think tanks and even universities is called for.
8. Conclusion
In this paper the reason why bank regulation based on the fractional
reserve and on the ﬁnancial intermediation theories of banking have not
been successful could be identiﬁed. On the other hand, having no bank
regulation is also not likely to be successful, as the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis
has shown: Bank credit derivatives had been entirely unregulated on
the advice of Alan Greenspan and other supporters of unregulatedmar-
kets. They have since concurred with their critics that regulation would
have been better. But what type of bank regulation is likely to be more
successful?
In the era when the credit creation theory of bankingwas dominant,
its proponents pointed out that bank credit creation and growth in eco-
nomic activity are connected, and credit for different types of transac-
tions has a diverging effect on the economy. They have thus favoured
bank regulation that directly targets bank credit, both its quantity and
its quality (i.e. the type of transaction that gets funded by bank credit),
whereby economically desirable bank credit is encouraged, and eco-
nomically harmful credit creation is forbidden or restricted quantita-
tively. The relationship between disaggregated bank credit creation on
the one hand and nominal GDP growth, real GDP growth and asset
prices on the other was identiﬁed by the Quantity Theory of Credit
(Werner, 1992, 1997, 2005, 2012, 2013), which can serve to guide the
direction of credit. In particular, guidance could be used to restrict credit
for transactions that do not contribute to nominal GDP: such credit for
ﬁnancial transactions creates asset boom-bust cycles and instability in
the banking system. Before the use of reserve requirements, capital ad-
equacy or interest rate targeting became dominant in the second half of
the 20th century, central banks focusedmore on controlling bank credit
directly. This policy was pioneered by the Reichsbank in 1912, but has
been tried and tested by most central banks sometime between the17 Hufﬁngton Post: Priceless: How the Fed bought the economics profession. By Ryan
Grim. 7 September 2009. Accessed at http://www.hufﬁngtonpost.com/2009/09/07/
priceless-how-the-federal_n_278805.html1920s through to the 1960s (with some continuing the practise until
the 1980s, such as the Bank of Japan and the Banque de France with
their ‘window guidance’ and encadrement du credit techniques, respec-
tively). Credit guidance has an excellent track record in achieving the
targeted credit growth and sectoral allocation (Werner, 2005). This is
especially relevant in the era of post-crisis monetary policy (see
Lyonnet and Werner, 2012, Werner, 2013).
The fact that banks create credit andmoney out of nothing which, if
used productively, results in non-inﬂationary growth, is important for
developing countries. Often it will not make sense to borrow from
abroad in order to stimulate domestic growth: the foreign money does
not enter the economy, and the country gets ensnared in spiralling for-
eign currency debt, when actually the foreign banks just created the
money out of nothing, something the developing country could have ar-
ranged for through its own domestic banks. It also has implications for
the question ofwho should pay for bankbailouts, shifting the pendulum
from burdening tax-payers towards central bankers (Werner, 2012).
The question why economics seems to have made no progress in the
20th century concerning a pivotal issue, namely the role of banks, is im-
portant and troubling. The thesis that conﬂicts of interest and indeed
vested interests may have been at play (especially emanating from cen-
tral banks and large banks) was discussed and requires further research.
Overall it canbesaid thatoneof the implicationsof this study is that itdoes
not make much sense to build economic theories of the ﬁnancial sector, if
these are not based on institutional (and accounting) realities. The role of
accounting and law in economics should be increased, both in research and
in the teaching of economics. This includes the role of national income ac-
counting and ﬂow of funds information (seeWinkler et al., 2013a, b), which
have to be reconciled with those records of the banks. These are not only
the “central settlementbureau, akindof clearinghouseorbookkeepingcentre
for the economic system” (Schumpeter, 1934, p. 124), but also the creators
and allocators of the money supply. The reﬂection of empirical bank reality
within theories and textbooks surely must become the ‘new normal’ in ﬁ-
nance and economics.
Finally, the conﬁrmation of the results reported in Werner (2014b)
further strengthens the call for a new, interdisciplinary research agenda
on the role of banks and the central bank in particular, and themonetary
system in general, which should be ﬁrmly rooted in the inductive, em-
pirical research methodology to produce scientiﬁc economics. While
many authors have proclaimed a continuous blurring of the division be-
tween banks and non-bank ﬁnancial institutions, Werner (2014c)
showed precisely what allows banks to create money (and capital)
out of nothing, while non-banks are unable to do so. Interdisciplinary
work with researchers in politics, law, accounting, management, opera-
tional research, information technology, engineering and systems re-
search is called for to ensure that economics and ﬁnance on their own
cannot continue to ignore empirical reality and embark on another
lost century for economic sciences.
Supplementary data to this article can be found online at http://dx.
doi.org/10.1016/j.irfa.2015.08.014.
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